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Abstract
We consider optimal contracts when a principal has two sources to detect bad
projects. The first one is an information technology without agency costs (ITP ),
whereas the second one is the expertise of an agent subject to moral hazard, adverse
selection and limited liability (ITA). First, we show that the principal does not
necessarily benefit from access to additional information and thereby may prefer to
ignore it. Second, we discuss different timings of information release, i.e. a disclosure
contract offered to the agent after the principal announced the result of ITP , and a
concealment contract where the agent exerts effort before ITP is checked. We find
that concealment is superior whenever the quality of ITP is sufficiently low. Then,
ITP is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited
to reduce the agent’s information rent under concealment. If the quality of ITP
improves, disclosure can be superior as it allows to adjust the agent’s effort to the
up-dated expected quality of the project. However, even for a highly informative ITP ,
concealment can be superior as it mitigates the adverse selection problem. Finally,
we prove that the principal always benefits from checking ITP if he chooses the
optimal timing of information release. In particular, he may benefit only if he does
not check ITP until the agent reported his findings.
Keywords: information revelation, endogenous timing, hidden action, limited li-
ability.
JEL classification: D02, D82, D86.
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1 Introduction
Motivation With the amount of accessible information increasing constantly, the op-
timal organization of information aggregation made it to the top of the agenda. While
economic theory focused on the analysis of economic relationships with a fixed distribution
of information for a long time (usually referred to as the principal–agent literature), more
recent research addressed the relation between information structure and optimal mecha-
nism design. Thereby, two research questions seem to be prevalent. How does a change
in the information structure influence optimal mechanism design? And does a mechanism
designer always benefit from the availability of additional information? A first answer to
this question is offered by the linkage principal as introduced in Milgrom and Weber (1982)
according to which a principal (or auctioneer) is always better off if he links the contract
(or price) to exogenous variables that are affiliated with the agent’s (or bidder’s) private
information. In particular they investigate how affiliated instead of private values (i.e.
information of bidders about each other’s willingness-to-pay) changes revenue maximizing
auction design. They show that open auction formats like the English auction yield higher
revenues than closed formats like a second-price sealed bid auction as bidders learn about
their own valuations through the published bids of their competitors. Thus the auctioneer
can benefit from additional information available to the bidders if he adjusts mechanism
design appropriately.1
An obviously related question is whether an auctioneer (or principal) can benefit in a similar
way from additional information available to himself. This has been discussed extensively
in the literature on informed principals (pioneered by Maskin and Tirole (1990) - see also
the literature review at the end of the introduction). A key assumption of this literature is
that the principal’s information is private and non-verifiable. A recent paper by Ottaviani
and Prat (2001) relates the value of information in such a setting to the respective value
if the principal has access to (verifiable) information that becomes public as soon as he
acquires it. In a model of monopolistic price discrimination they show that the principal
(the seller) always benefits from additional information (e.g. an outsider’s certification of
quality) available to him - be it private or not - as long as it is correlated with the agent’s
(buyer’s) private valuations. Moreover, they show for the private information case that it
is an optimal strategy for the principal to commit himself to reveal his information before
the agent chooses a contract.
This paper analyzes how these results carry over from the pure adverse selection setting
to situations that (in addition) involve moral hazard. We therefore focus on principal-
agent relationships where an agent exerts unobservable effort to determine the quality of
a project (moral hazard) and reports his findings opportunistically (adverse selection). In
addition, the principal has access to information that is correlated to the agent’s findings
(i.e. correlated to the quality of the project). Such a setting is relevant under many prac-
tical circumstances. Initially, our analysis has been motivated by a project concerning
1This result is strengthened in Cremer and McLean (1985). They provide sufficient conditions for
the information structure (i.e. the affiliation of bidders’ valuations) that guarantee the existence of a
mechanism that allows the auctioneer to extract all the surplus from trade.
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scoring systems for small enterprize loans. Loan officers who are supposed to improve and
to reveal their own knowledge from relationship lending to their superiors often seem to
duplicate the scoring system’s result without working seriously. Hence, one may question
if committing to run the scoring system (which provides verifiable information) after the
loan officer’s assessment is better. In a similar way, a doctor’s patient, a lawyer’s client or a
journal editor might consider not to reveal existing expertise or reports to their contractual
partner (doctor, lawyer or referee). Furthermore, consider an investor or a CEO who de-
cides when to undertake an in-house database research complementary to the (out-sourced)
work of a consulting agency. As a final example, our set-up applies to environmental au-
diting where an agency spends effort to investigate the security standards of a firm (i.e.
detects negligent firms). Meanwhile, the government can conduct pollution measurements
either to guide the agency towards suspected firms (disclosure) or to monitor the quality
of the agency’s findings (concealment).
Model and Main Results We analyze a model in which a principal owns an invetsment
project that can be either good or bad. The principal has two possibilities to improve his
knowledge about the project’s quality. On the one hand, he can use a costless information
technology (ITP ) that is not subject to any kind of incentive problem. With some proba-
bility the technology correctly identifies bad projects, the respective signal is verifiable and
publicly announced as soon as the principal checks it. On the other hand, the principal
can hire an agent (technology ITA) who may also detect bad projects with some probabil-
ity depending on his unobservable effort. After having investigated the project, the agent
reports his findings opportunistically to the principal. Hence, engaging the agent is not
only subject to moral hazard, but also to a truth-telling (adverse selection) problem. To
rule out a trivial franchise solution, the agent is assumed to have zero wealth, such that
all payments from the principal to the agent are non-negative. ITA, hence, resembles a
principal-agent problem with moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability.
Our paper addresses two main questions. First, we analyze whether access to additional
(costless) information can actually harm the principal. Second, we discuss the optimal
timing of information release, i.e. whether the principal should commit himself to check
(and reveal) ITP before or after the agent exerts effort. The first option will be called a
disclosure contract (CD) and the second one a concealment contract (CC). The advantage
of disclosure is that the principal will hire the agent only if ITP has not detected a bad
project as such a project will certainly fail. Furthermore, if the agent is hired, the principal
can offer a contract that adjusts the agent’s effort to the up-dated probability of a good
project. Both is not possible under concealment. The advantage of concealment, however,
is that the principal can use the signal provided by ITP (which is correlated with the agent’s
true findings) as a device to reduce the agent’s rent coming from the adverse selection
problem by paying positive wages if and only if the agent’s report and the signal’s outcome
coincide.
Regardless of the contract type, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection forces
the principal to pay the agent a positive wage if he reports a good project as well as if
3
he reports a bad project. Paying positive wages if the agent claims ”bad” is necessary to
induce effort (moral hazard problem) and paying the agent if he states ”good” is required
to prevent that he reports ”bad” without working at all (truth-telling or adverse selection
problem). Hence, the agent will receive information rents and the optimal contract is
determined by a trade-off between rent-reduction and effort selection.
We derive the following set of results: First, under a disclosure contract, the principal’s
expected profit is not necessarily increasing in the probability that the project is good.
This counterintuitive result is driven by the fact that a high percentage of good projects
makes it (for any given effort level) unlikely that the agent detects bad projects. This
reduces the agent’s expected returns to effort (and enhances the moral hazard problem).
Moreover, it increases his incentive to claim that the project is bad without working at
all (e.g. it aggravates the truth-telling problem). We show that these effects may well
dominate such that the principal’s profit is decreasing in the probability of good projects.
As a consequence, an ignorance contract where the principal does not check the (costless)
ITP may dominate the optimal disclosure contract. The reason is that the probability for
good projects is increasing if ITP does not detect a bad project, and this may reduce the
principal’s profits because of the aggravated moral hazard and adverse selection problem.
Hence, remaining uninformed can be superior.
As for a comparison between disclosure and concealment, we identify several factors deter-
mining which of the contracts should be chosen. A very clear-cut result is that concealment
dominates whenever the quality of ITP (defined by the probability piP that bad projects
are identified) is sufficiently small. In these cases, ITP is almost worthless under a disclo-
sure contract, while it can still be exploited to reduce the agent’s information rent under
concealment. On the other hand, it cannot be taken for granted that disclosure dominates
whenever the quality of ITP is sufficiently high - at first sight this seems to be a straight-
forward conjecture as the cost-savings of disclosure (due to not hiring the agent) increase
in piP . However, as the quality of ITP increases, the truth-telling problem also becomes
more severe (the reason again being that the agent is then more tempted to claim that a
project is bad without working at all). In fact, we show that disclosure is likely to dominate
only if the quality of ITP is in an intermediate range - if piP is too low, the advantage of
not hiring the agent becomes too small, and if piP is too high, the truth-telling problem
is too severe. This shows that ITP can also be too informative for disclosure contracts to
be optimal. Finally, while an optimal disclosure contract can be dominated by a contract
that ignores ITP , we show that concealment is always better than ignorance. Therefore,
additional information does not harm the principal if he chooses the optimal mechanism
- here, an optimal timing of information release.
Relation to the Literature Demski and Sappington (DS 1987b) is the only paper that
addresses the question of the optimal timing of information release in a principal-agent re-
lationship. DS 1987b is an extension of Demski and Sappington (1987a) that pioneers the
literature on delegated expertise. In these models, the principal delegates both the infor-
mation acquisition and a subsequent implementation decision (an investment, for instance)
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to the agent because communication is prohibitively costly. In DS 1987b, the agent’s un-
observable effort in acquiring information is binary, and the optimal (non-binary) imple-
mentation decision depends on both the agent’s and the principal’s information. DS 1987b
provide examples that illustrate the advantages of different timings of information release.
The continuous modelling of the agent’s effort costs in our paper allows for an analysis
of trade-offs between the costs of implementing truth-telling and selecting an effort level
and a characterization of information technologies that lead to different optimal timings
of information release.
In a recent paper, Gromb and Martimort (GM2004) discuss the optimal organization of
delegated expertise. While our paper is close to their contribution with respect to the
modelling of information and the basic features of the principal-agent relationship (risk-
neutrality, limited liability, and unobservable effort/findings), the two papers can be viewed
as complements for several reasons. First of all, we do not assume an environment of del-
egated expertise. The principal bases his investment decision on the available information
(be it his prior, ITP or ITA, or both), but decides himself. Nevertheless, delegation (e.g.
investment if and only if the agent does not detect a bad project) can arise endogenously
in our framework. Second - and more importantly, GM 2004’s focus is on the economies of
scale of delegated expertise. They show that additional signals for the same agent induce
diseconomies of scale (i.e. in the two signal case, agency costs are more than twice as large
as in the single signal case). In contrast, an additional agent – who has access to a similar
information technology – induces increasing returns to scale (i.e. agency costs for two
agents are less than twice as large as in the single agent case). Hence, GM 2004 emphasize
that principals benefit more from multiple experts with one signal each than from a single
expert with multiple signals. Our paper, however, takes the ”production-technology” of
information as given and investigates their optimal exploitation. In particular, we highlight
the importance of an appropriate timing of information release which is not discussed in
GM2004 and thereby assess the robustness of the scale-economies they identify.
Finally, our analysis is related to the literature on informed principals developed by Maskin
and Tirole (MT1990), Maskin and Tirole (MT1992) and Beaudry (1994) where the prin-
cipal may signal his private information through a menu of contracts. The main result of
MT1990 is that the principal strictly benefits from private information with respect to his
utility function. MT1992 show that this result does not carry over to situations where the
principal’s private information directly enters the agent’s pay-off. Chade and Silvers (2001)
factor moral hazard with respect to production (and not information acquisition) into these
models. They show that there are beliefs supporting a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
the principal is better off if his technology becomes less informative. The key difference be-
tween the models on informed principals and our paper is that the principal’s information
is private and non-verifiable in this literature whereas in our model the contract can be
made directly contingent on the principal’s verifiable information. Acquisition, however,
makes this information publicly accessible.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 derives
optimal contracts for some benchmark cases such as the first best or a pure moral hazard
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setting without adverse selection. Section 4 continues with optimal contract design for a
given timing of information release, while section 5 analyzes optimal timing options as a
function of the informativeness of the principal’s signal. Section 6 concludes with some
remarks concerning the applicability and robustness of our findings.
2 The model
A risk-neutral principal owns a project requiring initial investment outlays of I. The
project is of quality q ∈ {g, b}, and it is assumed to be ”good” (q = g) with probability
p0 ∈ (0, 1) and ”bad” (q = b) with probability (1− p0). If it is good, it yields return R. If
it is bad, it yields 0. The project’s expected net return is positive, i.e. p0R − I > 0. The
principal can base his decision on two information technologies, ITP and ITA.
The Principal’s Technology (ITP ): The principal has costless access to an information
technology (ITP ) that yields a signal sP ∈ {g, b} and thereby detects bad projects with
probability piP ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. piP = Pr(sP = b|q = b) and Pr(sP = b|q = g) = 0).
Hence, if the signal is sP = b the project is certainly bad. If the signal is sP = g the
probability of success is updated to pP > p0 where Bayesian consistency requires that
pP =
Pr((sP=g)∩(q=g))
Pr(sP=g)
= p0
1−(1−p0)piP . We will refer to piP as the quality (or informativeness)
of ITP . Note that there is no incentive problem associated with ITP . We assume that the
signal is verifiable and that it becomes common knowledge in the very moment when the
principal checks the IT.2
The Agent’s Technology (ITA): Second, the principal can hire a risk-neutral agent
who exerts unobservable effort to detect bad projects. Let e(piA) be the effort costs required
to identify a bad project with probability piA. Analogously to ITP , the agent’s technology
sends sA = b in case of detection and sA = b, otherwise. Hence, piA = Pr(sA = b|q = b)
while Pr(sA = b|q = g) = 0. We assume that e(piA) ∈ C3, that e(0) = e′(0) = e′′(0) = 0,
e′′′(piA) > 0 ∀pi ∈ [0, 1), and limpi→1 e′′′(piA) = ∞.3 piA can therefore be interpreted as the
quality of ITA. After having detected a bad project or not, the agent sends a verifiable
message m ∈ {g, b} to the principal. The agent’s findings are private information, and the
message is (thus) needs not to be truthful. The agent’s reservation utility is normalized to
0, and he is protected by limited liability in the sense that his wage must be non-negative
in each state of the world.
2If the principal can check and hide the signal, this leads to a signaling game where the principal may
signal his information through the contract he offers. But the principal’s signal (sP ) is binary in our model,
one can easily prove that there is no separating or pooling equilibrium leading to higher profits for the
principal then the profit maximizing contracts investigated below. Proof available on request.
3These assumptions ensure convexity of the principal’s optimization problem, and in particular unique-
ness of the optimal effort level or signal quality.
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Contracts The game starts at date t = 0 with a contract offer C by the principal. A
contract C is a collection (T, a,W ). T (the timing) is a mapping from the set of verifiable
events E to the set of orderings over E. Once the contract has been signed, T also depicts
the timing of the game. a (the investment decision) is a binary choice (invest or not)
defined on the set of available verifiable signals at the time of contract enforcement. W
(the wages) is a mapping from the set of available verifiable signals to R+0 .
4 We will refer
to the principal’s subgame-perfect equilibrium offers (for a given timing T ) as optimal
contracts. 5
Timing In our setting, the (maximum) set of verifiable events consists of signing a con-
tract (Sign), enforcing the contract or arranging payments (Enf), checking the princi-
pal’s signal (ITP ), checking the agent’s signal (ITA), and the investment decision (Inv).
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If the principal does not hire the agent, the obviously optimal timing is the sequence
T (ITP , Inv) = {ITP , Inv} as the signal is informative and costless. This defines the Null
contract (denoted by C0). If the principal hires the agent, (Sign) has to be before (ITA),
and (ITA) before (Enf). Obviously, the principal’s investment decision will always take
place after all information has been acquired and before the agent is payed.
Hence, we are left with four timing options: T1 = {Sign, ITP , ITA, Inv, Enf}, T2 =
{ITP , Sign, ITA, Inv, Enf}, T3 = {Sign, ITA, ITP , Inv, Enf}, and T4 = {Sign, ITA, Inv, Enf}.
T1 and T2 are equivalent as the agent is risk-neutral and the principal will offer the same
contract (contingent on his own signal) in both cases, so that we are left with T2, T3, and
T4. We will refer to a contract with timing T2 as a Disclosure Contract C
D (the principal
discloses ITP before the agent exerts effort). A contract with timing T3 is called a Con-
cealment Contract (CC) as ITP is concealed until the agent reports his findings. Finally,
T4 defines an Ignorance Contract (C
I) as ITP is ignored.
Investment Decision The principal’s investment decision (a) is a mapping from the
set of (available) verifiable information to the set {i, n} where i denotes the decision to
invest and n not to invest. For instance, if the principal chooses to use ITP and ITA, his
investment decision is a mapping a : {g, b} × {g, b} → {i, n}.
Wages Finally, a contract specifies (weakly positive) transfers to the agent contingent
on the feasible verifiable information, i.e. the signals by the information technologies
and the result of the project in case of investment. For instance, if the principal checks
4Implicitly, we exclude mixed strategies for the principal (e.g. that he only checks ITP with a positive
probability after the agent reported his findings or that he chooses different timing option with positive
probability). As long as ITP is costless and we investigate a one-shot game, it is easy to see that such a
mixed strategy can never be optimal. We return to this issue in the concluding section.
5Our assumptions on e(piA) ensure that subgame-perfection selects a unique contract offer (with the
only exception being section 3.3.3).
6Hence, we implicitly assume that the principal can not check his signal between the agent’s effort and
reporting decision. As effort is unobservable, this assumption seems justified. Moreover, it can be shown
that the principal will never be better off if he considers this timing of events. Proof available on request.
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ITP and ITA and the signal configuration suggests investment, wages are a mapping W :
{g, b}×{g, b}×{g, b} → R+0 denoted by W (sP , sA, q) where the first argument depicts the
result of ITP , the second ITA, and the last whether the project was successful or not. If the
principal decides to ignore some sources of information, feasible wage schemes are defined
accordingly. We denote the agent’s expected utility by U and the principal’s expected
profits by Φ.
3 Benchmarks
We start the analysis and comparison of the principal’s options by investigating three
benchmark contracts, namely the Null Contract C0 where the principal does not hire the
agent, the First Best Contract CF where the principal himself has access to ITA, and the
case without adverse selection (or truth-telling) problem where the agent’s findings are
verifiable.
3.1 Null Contract
If the principal decides not to hire the agent, he will obviously check ITP before he decides
upon investment. Optimal actions, transfers, and profits are depicted in the following
Lemma.7
Lemma 1. (i) pi0A = 0, (ii) a
0(sP ) = i if and only if sP = g. (iii) Φ
0 = Pr(sP =
g)(pPR− I) = p0R− Pr(sp = g)I. (iv) dΦ0dpiP > 0.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Of course, the principal invests if and only if sP = g, and his profit increases in the quality
of ITP (i.e. in piP ).
3.2 First Best
In the first best (CF ) the principal checks ITP and uses ITA if and only if sP = g. In this
case, he maximizes pP (R− I)− (1− pP )(1− piA)I − e(piA) w.r.t. piA which yields Lemma
2.8
Lemma 2. (i) piFA solves (1−pP )I = e′(piFA). (ii) aF (sP , sA) = i if and only if sP = sA = g.
(iii) ΦF = Pr(sP = g)(pPR− I + (1− pP )piFAI − e(piFA)). (iv) dΦ
F
dpiP
> 0.
Note that ITA is only checked if sP = g. Moreover, the assumptions on e(piA) guarantee
that piFA > 0 in this case. Hence, the first best contract is of disclosure type.
7We denote optimal transfers, actions and equilibrium profits for C0 by superscript 0.
8We denote optimal transfers, actions and equilibrium profits for CF by superscript F .
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3.3 Pure Moral Hazard
To distinguish the impact of moral hazard (hidden action) and truth-telling (hidden in-
formation) in our setting, we assume throughout this section that the agent’s findings
are observable and verifiable (i.e. m = sA) such that only only a moral hazard problem
remains.9
3.3.1 Ignorance
If the principal does not check ITP and hires the agent, observability of sA implies that he
invests if and only if sA = g. Hence, an ignorance contract specifies W (g, q) for q ∈ {g, b}
and W (b). For such a contract, the agent’s utility for a given signal quality piA (denoted
by U(piA)) is given by
U(piA) = p0W (g, g) + (1− p0)(piAW (b) + (1− piA)W (g, b))− e(piA) (1)
which yields the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)
(1− p0)(W (b)−W (g, b)) = e′(piA). (2)
The principal’s optimization program is10
max (p0(R− I −W (g, g))− (1− p0)(piAW (b) + (1− piA)(I +W (g, b)))
s.t.Eqn.(2),W (g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0,W (b) ≥ 0.
The solution to this program can be characterized as follows.11
Lemma 3. (i) piIA solves (1− p0)I = e′(piIA) + piIAe′′(piIA). (ii) W˜ I(g, g) = W˜ I(g, b) = 0 and
W˜ I(b) =
e′(epiIA)
1−p0 . (iii) a˜
I(sA) = i if and only if sA = g. (iv) Φ˜
I = p0R − I + (1− p0)piIAI −
piIAe
′(piIA).
First note that the agent will always be hired as his marginal disutility from effort is zero at
piA = 0. As the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (Eqn. (2)) is the only non-trivial
constraint, and as payments contingent on successful projects do not influence the agent’s
effort, the optimal contract offers only compensation for the detection of bad projects.
The principal’s profit as depicted in (iv) consists of the returns to investment (p0R − I),
the benefits (or cost savings) from hiring the agent ((1 − p0)piIA), and the agency costs
(piIAe
′(piIA)).
9Optimal contracts, actions, transfers, and profits for the pure moral hazard case are denoted by (˜).
10Note that d
2U(piA)
dpi2A
< 0 and that U(piA) ≥ 0 for piA = 0 such that the agent’s (ICC) ensures U > 0. Thus,
the agent’s participation constraint (U > 0) is ensured by (ICC) and can be neglected in all optimization
programs.
11We denote optimal contracts and actions for ignorance contract by superscript I.
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3.3.2 Disclosure
If the principal checks ITP before the agent signs a contract, he will never hire him if
sP = b. Hence, we can restrict attention to sP = g. Then, the agent’s expected utility
and the incentive compatibility constraint can be elicited from Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (2)
by substituting pP (the updated success-probability) for p0, and by specifying transfers as
follows. The principal does not pay anything if sP = b, pays W (g, g, g) if sP = sA = q = g,
W (g, b) if sP = g, and sA = b (recall that sA is observable such that there is no point
in investing in this case), and W (g, g, b) if sP = sA = g and q = b. The principal’s
optimization program is
max Pr(sP = g)(pP (R− I −W (g, g, g))
−(1− pP )(piAW (g, b) + (1− piA)(I +W (g, g, b))))
s.t.Eqn.(2)′,W (g, g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0,W (b) ≥ 0.
where Eqn.(2)’ denotes the incentive compatibility constraint as in Eqn.(2) with the up-
dated success probability pP instead of p0. The respective solution can be characterized as
follows.12
Lemma 4. piDA solves (1− pP )I = e′(piDA ) + piDA e′′(piDA ). (ii) W˜D(g, g, g) = W˜D(g, g, b) = 0
and W˜D(g, b) =
e′(epiDA )
1−pP . (iii) a˜
D(sP , sA) = i if and only if sP = sA = g. (iv) Φ˜
D = Pr(sP =
g)(pPR− I + (1− pP )piDA I − piDA e′(piDA )). (v) deΦ
D
dpiP
> 0.
A comparison of Lemma 2 (i) and 4 (i) shows that the signal quality (or effort) chosen in the
pure moral hazard case is smaller than in the first best solution (due to the binding limited
liability constraint). Moreover, equilibrium efforts in the disclosure contract are lower than
in the ignorance contract.13 Finally, the principal is strictly better off by checking ITP in
advance than by ignoring it as Φ˜D is monotone increasing in piP , and as an ignorance
contract resembles piP = 0.
3.3.3 Concealment
If the principal checks ITP after the agent’s investigation results are observed, he invests
if and only if sP = sA = g. Hence, a contract specifies W (g, g, g) (agent and principal do
not detect a bad project and the project turns out to be successful), W (g, g, b) (agent and
principal do not detect a bad project and the project fails), and the wages if at least one
technology detects a bad project (W (g, b), W (b, g), and W (b, b)). For such a contract, the
agent’s expected utility for a given signal quality piA is
U(piA) = p0W (g, g, g) + (1− p0)(piApiPW (b, b) + piP (1− piA)W (b, g)
+(1− piP )piAW (g, b) + (1− piP )(1− piA)W (g, g, b))− e(piA) (3)
12We denote optimal contracts and actions under policy D with superscript D.
13To see this note that (1− pP ) < (1− p0).
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which yields the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint
(1− p0)(piP (W (b, b)−W (b, g)) + (1− piP )(W (g, b)−W (g, g, b)) = e′(piA). (4)
The principal’s optimization program is
max p0(R− I −W (g, g, g))− (1− p0)(piA(1− piP )W (g, b)
+(1− piA)piPW (b, g) + piApiPW (b, b) + (1− pi0)(1− piA)(I +W (g, g, b)))
s.t.Eqn.(4),W (g, g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, g, b) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0,W (b, g) ≥ 0.
Optimal contracts can be characterized as follows.14
Lemma 5. (i) piCA solves (1 − p0)(1 − piP )I = piCAe′′(piCA) + e′(piCA). (ii) W˜C(g, g, g) =
W˜C(g, g, b) = W˜C(b, g) = 0 and (1 − p0)(piP W˜C(b, b) + (1 − piP )W˜C(g, b)) = e′(piCA). (iii)
a˜C(sP , sA) = i if and only if sP = sA = g. (iv) Φ˜
C = p0R− I + (1− p0)piP I + (1− p0)(1−
piP )pi
C
AI − piCAe′(piCA). (v) deΦ
C
dpiP
> 0.
As in the optimal ignorance and disclosure contracts, the agent is only compensated for
the detection of bad projects. Note that any combination of the respective wages W (g, b)
and W (b, b) fulfilling Eqn. (4) can be part of the optimal contract. The optimal signal
quality piC is smaller than piD.15
3.3.4 Endogenous Timing
For the pure moral hazard case, an inspection of the respective efforts and profits yields
the following comparison of the three different contract types.
Proposition 1. (i) piFA > pi
I
A > pi
D
A > pi
C
A > 0. (ii) Φ
F > Φ˜D > Φ˜C > Φ˜I > 0.
Proposition 1 shows the following trade-off between the marginal benefits of effort im-
plementation and an efficient use of ITP : First, recall from Lemma 3(i), 4(i), and 5(i))
that marginal costs of effort implementation are identical for the three contract types -
they consist of the marginal effort costs themselves (e′(piA)) and the additional marginal
costs due to moral hazard under limited liability - the marginal agency costs (piAe
′′(piA)).
The principal’s marginal benefits from the agent’s effort, however, differ for the three con-
tract types. In a disclosure contract, marginal benefits are smaller than for ignorance as
the agent is only hired if sP = g (and the probability to detect a bad project shrinks to
(1 − pP ) < (1 − p0)). In a concealment contract, marginal benefits are further reduced
as the agent provides valuable information only if he detects a bad project which has not
been detected by ITP (which happens with probability (1− p0)(1− piP ) < (1− pP )). This
14We denote optimal contracts and actions for a concealment contract by superscript C.
15To see this note that (1− pP ) > Pr(sP = g)(1− pP ) = (1− p0)(1− piP ).
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effect drives Part (i) and if it it were for marginal benefits alone, ignorance would domi-
nate disclosure, and disclosure would dominate concealment with respect to the principal’s
profits.
But on the other hand, the three contract types make different use of ITP both with
respect to the decision to hire the agent and with respect to investment. Under disclosure
and concealment contracts, the principal invests for the same signal configurations such
that these policies only differ with respect to the hiring decision. As the agent is hired too
often under concealment (in particular if sP = b), disclosure is less costly than concealment.
Under ignorance, however, the principal invests more into unsuccessful projects than under
disclosure and concealment, and he hires the agent as often as under concealment. Hence,
with respect to the use of ITP , disclosure is superior to concealment which dominates
ignorance from the principal’s point of view.
Taking both effects (marginal benefits of effort and use of ITP ) into account obviously
implies that disclosure dominates concealment. Moreover, Proposition 1 (ii) demonstrates
that the latter effect is stronger than the former when comparing ignorance and disclosure.
4 Optimal Contracts
We are now far enough along to consider the complete model with unobservable findings
(or adverse selection), and we will show that the profit–ranking as depicted in Proposition
1 is no longer valid. The following Lemma streamlines the analysis.
Lemma 6. (i) If the principal hires the agent, he does not invest whenever the agent sends
message m = b. (ii) If the agent chooses piA > 0, he tells the truth.
Lemma 6 implies that the agent’s and principal’s optimization program is identical to the
pure moral hazard situation in the previous section except for truth-telling constraints.
We will again consider the three contract types ignorance, disclosure, and concealment.
4.1 Ignorance
If the principal does not check ITP and hires the agent, Lemma 6 implies that he invests
if and only if sA = g. Hence, a contract specifies transfers W (g, q) for q ∈ {g, b} and
W (b). The agent’s utility from this contract for a given signal quality (U(piA)) is as in
Eqn. (1), and the incentive compatibility constraint is identical to Eqn. (2). Finally, the
agent reports truthfully (after spending a given effort e(piA)) if this weakly dominates not
working at all and always reporting sA = g, i.e.
U(piA) ≥ p0W (g, g) + (1− p0)W (g, b) (5)
and not working at all and always reporting sA = b, i.e.
U(piA) ≥ W (b). (6)
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Note that the right-hand-side of Ineq. (5) is just the agent’s expected utility U(piA) for
piA = 0. Hence, Ineq. (5) is implied by incentive compatibility. This given, the principal’s
optimization program is
max p0(R− I −W (g, g))− (1− p0)(piAW (b) + (1− piA)(I +W (g, b))
s.t.Eqn.(2), Ineq.(6),W (g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0,W (b) ≥ 0
which yields
Lemma 7. (i) piIA solves (1 − p0)I = e
′′(piIA)
1−p0 + e
′(piIA). (ii) W
I(g, b) = 0, W I(b) =
e′(piIA)
1−p0 ,
and W I(g, g) = 1
p0
((1− (1− p0)piIA)W I(b) + e(piIA)). (iii) aI(sA) = i if and only if m = g.
(iv) ΦI = p0R− I + (1− p0)piIAI − e
′(piIA)
1−p0 − e(piIA).
Besides paying for the detection of bad projects to mitigate the moral hazard problem,
the principal now has to offer compensations for reporting good projects to satisfy the
truth-telling constraint Ineq. (6). Otherwise, the agent would always report that he has
detected a bad project. In an optimal contract the truth-telling constraint is binding. Note
that the principal pays positive wages if message m = g is send only if the project proves
successful (i.e. W (g, b) = 0) as this relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. Since
the truth-telling constraint increases marginal costs of effort implementation, the principal
implements a lower effort, so that we have piIA < pi
I
A and Φ
I
A < Φ˜
I
A. The strict increase in
agency costs compared to the pure moral hazard case can be seen in a comparison of the
terms proportional to e′(piA) in Lemma 3 (iv) and Lemma 7 (iv).
4.2 Disclosure
As in subsection 3.3.2, the principal does not hire the agent if sP = b. Hence, a disclosure
contract again specifies W (g, g, g), W (g, b) and W (g, g, b). The agent’s utility and his
(ICC) can again be derived from the ignorance contract by substituting pP for p0, and by
changing the transfers accordingly. Hence,
U(piA) = pPW (g, g, g) + (1− pP )(piAW (g, b) + (1− piA)W (g, g, b))− e(piA) (7)
which yields the agent’s (ICC)
(1− pP )(W (g, b)−W (g, g, b)) = e′(piA). (8)
Honest reporting now requires
U(piA) ≥ pPW (g, g, g) + (1− pP )W (g, b) (9)
and
U(piA) ≥ W (g, b). (10)
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As in subsection 4.1, Ineq. (9) is implied by incentive compatibility. This given, the
principal’s optimization program is
max Pr(sP = g)(pP (R− I −W (g, g, g))
−(1− pP )(piAW (g, b) + (1− piA)(I +W (g, g, b))))
s.t.Eqn.(8), Ineq.(10),W (g, g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, g, b) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0
which leads to
Lemma 8. (i) piDA solves (1 − pP )I = e
′′(piDA )
1−pP + e
′(piDA ). (ii) W
D(g, g, b) = 0, WD(g, b) =
e′(piDA )
1−pP , and W
D(g, g, g) = 1
pP
((1− (1−pP )piDA )WD(g, b)+ e(piDA )). (iii) aI(sP , sA) = i if and
only if m = sP = g. (iv) Φ
D = Pr(sP = g)(pPR− I + (1− pP )piDA I − e
′(piDA )
1−pP − e(piDA )). (v)
dΦ
dpiP
= (1− p0)(1− piDA )I + e′(piDA ) (1−p0)(1−2pP )(1−pP )2 + (1− p0)e(piDA ). (vi) Suppose that pP ≤ 1/2,
then dΦ
D
dpiP
> 0. (vii) Suppose that p0 > 1/2, then there exists e(pi) and  > 0 such that
dΦD
dpiP
< 0 if piP < .
For the same reasons as in the optimal ignorance contract, the principal offers compensa-
tions only if the agent reports a bad project or if he reports a good project which turns
out to be successful (see (ii)). As in the pure moral hazard case, marginal benefits of
effort are lower in the disclosure case than for ignorance as the probability of bad projects
shrinks from (1− p0) to (1− pP ) (see the left-hand-side of Lemma 7(i) and Lemma 8(i)).
However, marginal costs of effort implementation are no longer identical (as they were in
the pure moral hazard case). An inspection of Lemma 7(iv) and Lemma 8(iv)) reveals
that (for any given signal quality piA) agency costs due to limited liability and truth-telling
for the optimal ignorance contract ( e
′(piA)
1−p0 ) are smaller than agency costs for the optimal
disclosure contract ( e
′(piA)
1−pP ). The smaller the probability of a bad project (i.e. the prob-
ability to get compensated with W I(b) or WD(g, b)), the more tempting is the option to
always announce m = b (getting this compensation for sure). Therefore, the update from
p0 to pP in the disclosure contract does not only reduce marginal benefits from effort (as
in the pure moral hazard case) but also tightens the truth-telling constraint and thereby
increases marginal effort costs. As a consequence piIA > pi
D
A . (vii) shows that this effect
may well lead to an overall profit-reducing effect of an improvement of ITP (i.e.
dΦD
dpiP
< 0).
dΦD
dpiP
(as depicted in (v)) is a sum of three contributions. (1− p0)(1− piDA )I is the marginal
cost saving of no investment, (1 − p0)e(piDA ) is the marginal cost saving of not hiring the
agent, and e′(piDA )
(1−p0)(1−2pP )
(1−pP )2 is the marginal cost of effort implementation. While the
first two terms are strictly positive, the third one is negative if and only if pP > 1/2 (see
(vi)). In the Appendix we provide an example showing that the latter effect may well
dominate such that dΦ
D
dpiP
< 0 even if ITP is rather uninformative. The crucial feature of the
example is that the agent’s effort is relatively cheap (due to a flat e(piA) for piA ∈ [0, 1)).
Then, cost-savings due to not hiring the agent are small and costs are mainly driven by
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the implementation of truth-telling. In such a situation, Lemma 8 (vii) shows that better
information (higher piP ) can be harmful for the principal.
4.3 Concealment
By definition of a concealment contract, the signal is checked after the agent’s report. Given
Lemma 6, any concealment contract specifies transfers W (g, g, g), W (g, g, b), W (g, b),
W (b, g), and W (b, b). The agent’s expected utility for a given signal quality piA is given by
Eqn. (3) and the agent’s (ICC) is Eqn.(4). To prevent that the agent always claims that
the project is good,
U(piA) ≥ p0W (g, g, g) + (1− p0)(piPW (b, g) + (1− piP )W (g, g, b)) (11)
must hold which is again implied by (ICC). Not always claiming the project to be bad
requires
U(piA) ≥ p0W (g, b) + (1− p0)(piPW (b, b) + (1− piP )W (g, b)). (12)
This given, the principal’s optimization program is
max p0(R− I −W (g, g, g))− (1− p0)(piA(1− piP )W (g, b)
+(1− piA)piPW (b, g) + piApiPW (b, b) + (1− piP )(1− piA)(I +W (g, g, b)))
s.t.Eqn.(4), Eqn.(12),W (g, g, g) ≥ 0,W (g, g, b) ≥ 0,W (g, b) ≥ 0,W (b, g) ≥ 0
which leads to
Lemma 9. (i) piCA solves (1−p0)(1−piP )I = e′′(piCA)+e′(piCA).(ii) WC(g, g, b) = WC(b, g) =
WC(g, b) = 0, WC(b, b) =
e′(piCA)
(1−p0)piP , and W
D(g, g, g) = 1
p0
((1 − p0)(1 − piA)piPWD(b, b) +
e(piCA)). (iii) a
I(sP , sA) = i if and only if m = sP = g. (iv) Φ
C = p0R− I + (1− p0)piP I +
(1− p0)(1− piP )piAI − e′(piCA)− e(piCA). (v) dΦdpiP > 0.
In a concealment contract, the principal uses ITP as a stochastic signal for the agent’s
findings and pays him for the detection of bad projects if and only if sP = b - in contrast
to the pure moral hazard case where both W (b, b) and W (g, b) could be positive in an
optimal contract. Intuitively, truth-telling (Ineq. (12)) is easier to satisfy for W (g, b) = 0
while both W (b, b) and W (g, b) are equally effective in securing incentive compatibility.
A comparison of Lemma 5(i) and 9(i) shows that the marginal returns to effort (1 −
p0)(1 − piP )I are the same as in the pure moral hazard case. Marginal costs of effort
implementation, however, increase due to the binding truth-telling constraint (see the
right-hand-side of Lemma 5(i) and 9(i))). For concealment, the increase in agency costs
due to truth-telling (for a given effort level) is strictly smaller than for disclosure and
ignorance as the signal provided by ITP can be used more effectively to reduce the agent’s
information rent.
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5 Optimal Timing of Information Release
5.1 Inferiority of the Null Contract
An inspection of the respective first order conditions shows that the principal is always
better off by a disclosure or concealment contract with a strictly positive effort level then
by not hiring the agent.
Lemma 10. (i) ΦD > Φ0. (ii) ΦC > Φ0.
This follows immediately from the assumption that e′′(piA) = 0 for piA = 0 so that both
marginal effort costs and marginal agency costs are zero for vanishing signal quality. We
discuss the relevance of this assumption in the concluding section.
5.2 Inferiority of Ignorance
As ITP is costless for the principal, one could conjecture that it can never be optimal to
ignore this signal. In fact, the optimal ignorance contract is always inferior to concealment.
However, as stated in the following proposition, ignorance may be superior to disclosure.
Proposition 2. (i) ΦC > ΦI . (ii) Suppose that pP ≤ 1/2, then ΦD > ΦI . (iii) Suppose
that p0 > 1/2, then there exists e(pi) and  > 0 such that Φ
D < ΦI if piP <  .
For part (i) of the Proposition, recall that concealment already dominated ignorance in the
pure moral hazard case (due to the more efficient use of ITP ). The additional truth-telling
problem only reinforces this effect as the increase in costs of effort implementation due
to the binding truth-telling constraint is smaller under concealment. The comparison to
disclosure (see (ii) and (iii)), however, is more subtle due to the non-monotonicity of ΦD in
piP (see Lemma 8 (vi) and (vii)). As limpiP→0Φ
D = ΦI , a sufficient condition for ΦD > ΦI
is dΦ
D
dpiP
> 0 which is – according to Lemma 8 (vi) – guaranteed by pP ≤ 1/2. On the
other hand, the example provided in Appendix 2 shows that dΦ
D
dpiP
can be negative for piP
small enough. This implies that ΦD < ΦI in a neighborhood of piP = 0. Intuitively, the
effort-cost function provided in the example is sufficiently flat as to implement a high effort
level at low costs. Hence, the advantages of disclosure (cost savings from not hiring the
agent and effort adjustments to new available information) are less important compared
to the costs of truth-telling that increase in piP (see discussion of Lemma 8). This drives
ignorance superior to disclosure.
5.3 Superiority of Disclosure?
In the pure moral hazard case disclosure outperformed all other contract types. The
advantage of disclosure compared to concealment is that the agent is not hired if the signal
is bad, and that the agent’s effort can be adjusted to the updated probability that the
project is good. Now, there is a countervailing effect – concealment contracts allow to
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mitigate the truth-telling problem. In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for
the superiority of disclosure.
Proposition 3. Suppose p0 < 1/4 and piP ∈ [1−
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ,
1+
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ]. Then Φ
D > ΦC > ΦI .
The comparison of disclosure and concealment is complicated by the fact that the optimal
signal qualities are different. To get clear-cut results for the superiority of disclosure, we
therefore rely on cases where disclosure beats concealment even if the principal implements
the suboptimal signal quality piCA in a disclosure contract. The profit difference between
disclosure and concealment then consists only of two terms: First, e(piA)(1−Pr(sP = g)) =
e(piA)(1− p0)piP expresses the more efficient use of ITP . This term is increasing in piP and
captures the intuitive advantage of disclosure for informative (high piP ) technologies. The
second term, e′(piA)
1−pP−Pr(sP=g)
1−pP = e
′(piA)(1− (1−(1−p0)piP )2(1−p0)(1−piP ) ) is the difference in the costs of
effort implementation. For p0 > 1/4 this term is negative such that disclosure can only be
superior due to adjusted effort selection. For p0 < 1/4, however, this contribution is positive
around a local maximum at some piP ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. in the interval in the Proposition).
Intuitively, if piP is low, a disclosure contract can merely do better than ignorance, but
ignorance is known to be inferior to concealment (see Proposition 2(i)). On the other
hand, we know from the discussion of Lemma 8 and Proposition 2 (iii) that the benefits
of disclosure are small if a mitigation of the truth-telling problem is important, and this
truth-telling effect becomes more severe if piP increases.
16 This leads to an increasing
relative profitability of concealment if piP grows, and suggests that concealment can be the
optimal timing of information release if ITP is sufficiently uninformative or sufficiently
informative.
5.4 Superiority of Concealment?
The sufficient conditions for superiority of disclosure in Proposition 3 suggest that con-
cealment might be optimal for small values of piP (an uninformative ITP ), and for large
values of piP if the truth-telling problem is pronounced. The following result proves this
conjecture.
Proposition 4. (i) There is always an  > 0 such that ΦC > ΦD if piP ∈ (0, ). (ii) Suppose
that p0 > 1/4 or p0 < 1/4 together with either piP ∈ (0, 1−
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ) or piP ∈ (
1+
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) , 1).
Then ΦC > ΦD if e
′(pi)
e(pi)
> 1−Pr(sP=g)Pr(sP=g)
1−pP −1
∀piA > 0.
Part (i) of the Proposition expresses that concealment is optimal whenever ITP is suffi-
ciently uninformative. This builds on a familiar result from the literature on contracting
under limited liability. Even if the stochastic signal is almost uncorrelated with the agent’s
performance (piP close to zero) it remains a tool to reduce the agent’s information rents.
16To see this just compare the terms proportional to W (g, b) in Ineq. (10) with the terms proportional
to W (b, b) in Ineq. (12).
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The advantage of disclosure, however, disappears for piP → 0 as the agent is always hired
and the implemented effort can not be adjusted.
Part (ii) complements Proposition 3. If the informativeness of ITP measured through piP is
not within the range depicted in Proposition 3, Part (ii) shows that concealment is superior
whenever the truth-telling problem is sufficiently pronounced. If the ratio e′(piA)/e(piA) is
large for all piA it will in particular be large in equilibrium. Agency costs or costs of
effort implementation (e′(piA)) are then high compared to the pure cost reimbursement
for the agent (e(piA)). But then, the profit difference between disclosure and concealment
is mainly driven by the different costs of effort implementation and not by an adjusted
hiring decision. Thus, concealment contracts reduce costs of effort implementation more
effectively than disclosure contracts if piP is either very small or very large - in the former
case because disclosure is not substantially better than ignorance, in the latter because
truth-telling is easier to fulfill under concealment. Hence, in settings with substantial
agency costs (i.e. e
′(piA)
e(piA)
large), and either low informativeness (piP small) or a substantial
truth-telling problem (p0 and piP large), concealment is superior.
6 Discussion
We have analyzed optimal contracts in a model where a principal can improve his knowl-
edge about a project’s quality by using two sources, one of them (ITP ) without incentive
problems, and the other one (ITA) burdened with moral hazard, adverse selection (truth–
telling) and limited liability. We analyzed under which circumstances it is profit maximizing
to offer a disclosure contract (ITP is checked beforehand), or a concealment contract (ITP
is acquired after the agent reports his findings). We have found that a sufficient condition
for the superiority of concealment is that the quality of ITP is sufficiently small. In this
cases, ITP is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited
to substantially reduce the agent’s information rent under concealment. If ITP improves,
it is more likely that disclosure is favorable as the possibility not to hire the agent and/or
to adjust the agent’s effort to the up-dated expected quality of the project becomes more
important. However, increasing the informativeness of ITP also tightens the truth-telling
constraint in a disclosure contract, so that concealment can well be superior because ITP
is too informative for disclosure to perform well.
From a practical point of view, our findings first imply that the optimal timing depends
crucially on the informativeness of ITP . If, for instance, a bank has a relatively poor scor-
ing system, it should run the automatic analysis only after the loan officer has submitted
his report. Second, and maybe less intuitively, concealment can also prove superior if the
automatic scoring system is sufficiently precise but it is very costly to make the agent work
hard and to achieve truthful reporting. Both results suggest a closer look at the com-
mon practice of directly revealing automatic scoring results and subsequently contracting
with a loan officer. In cases without a pronounced truth-telling problem (like in journal-
refereeing, for instance), an immediate disclosure of existing information proves useful.
The comparative statics with respect to piP as identified in this paper offers a guideline for
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optimal contract design. In particular, our contribution shows that a mechanism designer
or principal does not necessarily benefit from new information if the agency problem at
hand includes both moral hazard and adverse selection unless he offers a contract with a
tailor-made timing of information acquisition.
Let us now discuss the robustness of our findings. In the loan officer-case, risk-aversion
seems to be a natural extension. In the optimal concealment contract, the principal will
then also pay positive wages if the signal and the report do not coincide, because this leads
to better risk-sharing. Still, the detection premium would be higher if the signal is bad (to
reduce the agent’s rent). The basic trade-off analyzed in the paper would still exist with
risk-aversion, but the usual trade-off between insurance and incentives would result in a
less transparent exposition.
Moreover, the principal-agent relationship considered in our paper may be a repeated
one. In an (infinitely) repeated game the following should be an equilibrium: with some
(arbitrarily small) probability the principal invests even if the agent reports a bad signal,
and threatens to end the contractual relationship if the project yields R (which means that
the agent has lied with probability one). This should almost eliminate the truth-telling
problem, since the agent loses all of his future rents. However, investing even with a bad
signal may not be renegotiation-proof, and we enter a discussion of commitment that is
clearly beyond the objective of our model.
With respect to the information technologies ITP and ITA we made five crucial assump-
tions. First, both technologies ITP and ITA are such that a bad signal implies that the
project certainly fails. While this assumption captures central features of some applica-
tions like auditing (for environmental protection, for instance, an expertise usually detects
negligent firms - i.e. bad projects) or simple credit scoring (the system identifies non-
trustworthy borrowers), it seems not very appealing for other fields like e.g. consultancy
or scientific reviewing processes. In a companion working paper (Feess, Schieble, and Walzl
(2004)), we assume that a good (bad) signal increases (decreases) the (ex-post) probability
of a good project. This modelling obviously contains the model used in this paper as a
special cases. While the superiority of concealment for almost uninformative signals can
also be shown in such an environment, the identification of parameter regions that support
the optimality of concealment for very informative signals and superiority of disclosure for
intermediate technologies turns out to be much more cumbersome. In fact, we can only
provide examples that support the same intuition as developed in this paper.
Second, effort costs for the agent are modelled such that the agent is always hired as long
as the principal does not know that the project will fail (in particular after he received
sP = b in a disclosure contract). One could conjecture a bias in favor of concealment
due to this modelling detail. For certain effort costs e(pi), sP = g could suggest direct
investment without hiring the agent in a disclosure contract (resembling another advantage
of disclosure not accounted for in our model). Clearly, this additional advantage would
introduce another configuration that supports disclosure as the optimal timing option.
If piP and therefore pP (the ex-post probability of a successful project) is close to one,
disclosure will always be the optimal timing option, as ITP detects good projects (almost)
with certainty (and without any costs), while the agent is still hired under concealment
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(and receives positive rents). While this does not question superiority of concealment for
low values of piP it clearly qualifies our findings regarding very informative technologies.
One can easily construct configurations where concealment is superior for piP sufficiently
small (piP < pi
1
P ∈ (0, 1), say) and in an intermediate region (between pi2P ∈ (0, 1) and
pi3P ∈ (0, 1) with pi2P < pi3P ), while disclosure is optimal for piP ∈ (pi1P , pi2P ) and for any
piP > pi
3
P . We discuss this in more detail in the companion working paper (Feess, Schieble,
Walzl (2004)).
Third, we assumed ITP to be costless (instead of e.g. endowing the principal with a
technology more comparable to ITA where he exerts effort e(piP ) and thereby detects bad
projects with probability piP ). In such a setting one would wish to identify characteristics
of the principal’s effort cost function that support the various timing options. In fact, our
contribution offers several insights for such an environment. It is a corollary of Proposition
3(i) that concealment is superior if the principal’s cost function is sufficiently steep. On the
other hand, it is an implication of Proposition 3 and 4(ii) that concealment is not necessarily
inferior if the principal’s effort is sufficiently cheap (as high informativeness does not imply
superiority of disclosure). In a similar way, our analysis suggests that the principal’s
optimal effort under concealment is not necessarily lower than under disclosure (which could
be conjectured if disclosure was optimal as long as ITP would be sufficiently informative).
Hence, while the crucial effects at work are identical to the dynamics described in this
paper, the optimal timing and the principal’s optimal effort level would depend on tiny
details of the respective cost-functions that are not straightforward to identify.
Fourth, we followed the benchmark case of Ottaviani and Prat (2001) in assuming that the
signal of ITP is (verifiable) public information once it has been checked by the principal.
Our results possess a certain robustness in this respect. As the signal is binary it is easy
to see that the principal can not improve upon the contracts discussed in this paper by
(partially) hiding private information. A comparison of (non-verifiable) private and (verifi-
able) public information would therefore require a richer signal-space and a re-iteration of
Ottaviani and Prat’s (2001) analysis of combination of moral hazard and adverse selection.
In such a case, also our restriction to pure strategies for the principal would no longer be
an innocent one.
Fifth and related, none of the technologies requires the investment of fixed costs. Assuming
that checking ITP asks for a fixed fee of fP and hiring the agent costs fA in advance, does
not alter the effects identified in the paper but adds other driving forces that may well
influence the optimal timing decision. Consider, for instance, a situation where checking
ITP is quite costly (i.e. fP >> fA). While the principal has to invest into ITP in a
disclosure contract, he can design a concealment contract where he commits himself to
check only with a small positive probability. In such a situation, concealment will prove
superior because of the respective rent-reduction effect. On the other hand, if hiring the
agent requires substantial costs while checking ITP does not (fA >> fP ) disclosure can
prove optimal as the agent is hired less often. In the presence of fixed costs the distinction
between private and public information becomes also more pronounced as the principal
has then an incentive to check ITP with a positive probability bounded away from 1 under
concealment and disclosure. We consider it an interesting topic for further research to
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complement our insights about the nature of agency costs in the presence of moral hazard
and adverse selection with Ottaviani and Prat (2001)’s findings on the relation between
public and private information.
Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
If the principal does not hire the agent (part (i)), he will invest if and only if sP = g (part
(ii)) as a bad signal implies that the project will yield zero profit. Following this strategy,
the principal’s profit is as given in part (iii), and dΦ
0
dpiP
= (1− p0)I > 0 (part (iv)). 
Proof of Lemma 2
(i)-(iii). Obvious. (iv) From Pr(sP = g)(1 − pP ) = (1 − p0)(1 − piP ) and the Envelope
Theorem is follows that dΦ(CFB)
dpiP
= (1− p0)((1− piFA)I + e(piFA)) > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Using Eqn. (2), the principal’s profit simplifies to Φ = p0R−I+(1−p0)piAI−p0W (g, g)−
(1− p0)piAW (g, b)− piAe′(piA), which has to be maximized with respect to W (b), W (g, g),
andW (g, b) subject to the limited liability constraints. Φ is monotone decreasing inW (g, b)
and W (g, g). Hence, the (unique) solution is given by (i), and (ii) (W˜ I(b) =
e′(epiIA)
1−p0 follows
directly from Eqn. (2)). (iii) follows from m = sA and the characteristics of ITA. (iv) is
the principal’s profit for an optimally chosen piA - see (i).
Proof of Lemma 4
(i)-(ii) follow from Lemma 3 by substituting pP for p0 and re-specifying transfers for the
case sP = g. (iii) follows from the observability and characteristics of ITP and ITA. (iv)
holds due to Lemma 3 and (i)-(iii). (v) dΦ
dpiP
= (1− p0)((1− piA)I + piDA e′(piDA )) > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Using Eqn. (4), the principal’s profit simplifies to Φ = p0(R − I − W (g, g, g)) − (1 −
p0)(1− piP )(1− piA)I − piAe′(piA)− (1− p0)((1− piP )W (g, g, b) + piPW (b, g)), which has to
be maximized with respect to W (b, b), W (g, b), W (g, g, g), W (g, g, b), and W (b, g) subject
to the limited liability constraints. Φ is monotone decreasing in W (g, g, g), W (g, g, b), and
W (b, g). Hence, all the respective limited liability constraints have to be binding and we
are left with (ICC) that has to be fulfilled by an appropriate choice of W (b, b) and W (g, b)
- see (ii). (i) is the first order condition for the optimal signal quality piCA . (iii) follows
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once again from observability and signal characteristics. (iv) is obvious, and taking the
derivative yields (v): d
eΦC
dpiP
= (1− p0)(1− piCA)I > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) follows from a comparison of the first order conditions in Lemma 2, 3, 4, and 5 (i)
and the assumptions on e(pi). (ii) ΦF > Φ˜D follows from piF 6= piD. For Φ˜D > Φ˜C ,
suppose that the principal implements the (suboptimal) signal quality piCA in the disclosure
contract. Let us denote the respective profit by Φ˜D(piA = pi
C
A). Then Φ˜
D(piA = pi
C
A)− Φ˜C =
(1− p0)piPpiCAe′(piCA) > 0. But as the principal’s profit from the optimal disclosure contract
has to be strictly higher than Φ˜D(piA = pi
C
A), Φ˜
D > Φ˜C follows. Suppose now that the
principal implements the (suboptimal) signal quality piIA through a concealment contract.
Then Φ˜C(piA = pi
I
A)−Φ˜I ≥ 0 implies Φ˜C > Φ˜I as - once again - implemented efforts are non-
identical for the different contract types (see (i)) and profits for an optimal concealment
contract are strictly higher than Φ˜C(piA = pi
C
A). 
Proof of Lemma 6
(i) Suppose not. This means that the principal’s decision is independent of the agent’s
report. But then, hiring the agent has no benefit. (ii) If the agent lies, he either sends
m = g or m = b regardless of his findings. Define P (m) as his expected payment in this
case. Then, his expected utility is U(piA) = P (m) − e(piA) which is strictly decreasing in
piA. 
Proof of Lemma 7
Inserting Eqn. (2) in the principal’s profit function simplifies the program to maximize
Φ = p0R− I +(1− p0)piAI − p0W (g, g)− (1− p0)W (g, b)−piAe′(piA) with respect to W (b),
W (g, g), and W (g, b) subject to the limited liability and truth-telling constraints. The
corresponding Lagrangian is given by
L = Φ+ λTT (U(piA)−W (b)) + λW (g,g)W (g, g) + λW (g,b)W (g, b) + λW (b)W (b)
and the system of first order conditions is
∂L
∂W (g, g)
= −p0 + λTTp0 + λW (g,g) = 0
∂L
∂W (g, b)
= −(1− p0) + ∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (g, b)
+ λTT (1− p0)(1− piA) + λW (g,b) = 0
∂L
∂W (b)
=
∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (b)
+ λTT ((1− p0)piA − 1) + λW (b) = 0 (13)
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where ∂Φ
∂piA
= −piAe′′(piA)−e′(piA)+(1−p0)I, dpiAdW (g,b) = − 1−p0e′′(piA) , and
dpiA
dW (b)
= 1−p0
e′′(piA)
(the last
two results are applications of the Implicit Function Theorem to Eqn. (2)). To solve System
(13) observe first that λW (g,b) = 0 (a necessary requirement for W (g, b) > 0) implies that
λTT > 0 is fully determined by
∂L
∂W (g,b)
= 0. This implies λW (b) > 0 as otherwise
∂L
∂W (b)
= 0
could not be fulfilled. But then W (b) = 0 such that the incentive compatibility constraint
can not be fulfilled for a positive signal quality. Therefore, we will assume W I(g, b) = 0
from now on, and suppose that ∂L
∂W (g,b)
= 0 is solved by an appropriate choice of λW (g,b) > 0.
Now suppose that W (g, g) = 0. In this case the truth-telling constraint Ineq. (6) can not
be satisfied. But if W (g, g) > 0 (and thus λW (g,g) = 0), the first equation in System (13)
implies that λTT = 1. Hence, the truth-telling constraint is binding and W
I(g, g) is given
as in (ii). Plugging λTT = 1 and λW (b) = 0 into
∂L
∂W (b)
= 0 yields the effort selection
constraint (1 − p0)I = e′′(piA)1−p0 + e′(piA) (as depicted in (i)). (iii) follows from the satisfied
truth-telling constraints and the nature of the signal. Finally, we get (iv) by inserting
W (g, b) = 0, W I(b), and W I(g, g) into Φ. 
Proof of Lemma 8
The proof of (i) – (iv) is identical to the proof of Lemma 7 except that p0 is substituted by
pP , and that transfers account for sP = g whenever the agent is hired. (v) and (vi) follows
directly from (iv). (vii) is shown by the example in Appendix 2. 
Proof of Lemma 9
Inserting Eqn. (4) in the principal’s profit function simplifies the program to maximize
Φ = p0(R−I−W (g, g, g))−piAe′(piA)−(1−p0)((1−piP )W (g, g, b)+piPW (b, g))−(1−p0)(1−
piP )(1 − piA)I with respect to W (b, b), W (g, b), W (b, g) W (g, g, g), and W (g, g, b) subject
to the limited liability constraint and the truth-telling constraint given by Ineq.(12). The
corresponding Lagrangian is
L = Φ+ λTT (U(piA)− p0W (g, b)− (1− p0)(piPW (b, b) + (1− piP )W (g, b)))
+λW (g,g,g)W (g, g, g) + λW (g,g,b)W (g, g, b)
+λW (g,b)W (g, b) + λW (b,b)W (b, b) + λW (b,g)W (b, g)
and the system of first order conditions is
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∂L
∂W (g, g, g)
= −p0 + λTTp0 + λW (g,g,g) = 0
∂L
∂W (g, g, b)
= −(1− p0)(1− piP ) + ∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (g, g, b)
+λTT (1− p0)(1− piP )(1− piA) + λW (g,g,b) = 0
∂L
∂W (b, g)
= −(1− p0)piP + ∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (b, g)
+λTT (1− p0)piP (1− piA) + λW (g,g,b) = 0
∂L
∂W (g, b)
=
∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (g, b)
+λTT ((1− p0)(1− piP )(piA − 1)− p0) + λW (g,b) = 0
∂L
∂W (b, b)
=
∂Φ
∂piA
dpiA
dW (b, b)
+ λTT (1− p0)piP (piA − 1) + λW (b,b) = 0 (14)
where ∂Φ
∂piA
= (−piAe′′(piA)− e′(piA) + (1− p0)(1− piP )I), dpiAdW (g,g,b) = − (1−p0)(1−piP )e′′(piA) ,
dpiA
dW (b,g)
=
− (1−p0)piP
e′′(piA)
, dpiA
dW (b,b)
= (1−p0)piP
e′′(piA)
and dpiA
dW (g,b)
= (1−p0)(1−piP )
e′′(piA)
.
Suppose now that either W (b, g) or W (g, g, b) are strictly positive (and the correspond-
ing Lagrange multiplier is thus zero). Then λTT is fully determined by (
∂L
∂W (b,g)
= 0) or
( ∂L
∂W (g,g,b)
= 0), respectively. Inserting such a λTT into
∂L
∂W (b,b)
and ∂L
∂W (g,b)
implies λW (b,b) > 0
(i.e. W (b, b) = 0) and λW (g,b) > 0 (i.e. W (g, b) = 0) - which violates (ICC). Hence, we
get WC(g, g, b) = WC(b, g) = 0. This given, W (g, g, g) has to be strictly positive to sat-
isfy Ineq. (12) which means that λW (g,g,g) = 0 such that
∂L
∂W (g,g,g)
= 0 implies λTT = 1
(i.e. the truth-telling constraint is binding). Inserting λTT = 1 into
∂L
∂W (g,b)
= 0 and
∂L
∂W (b,b)
= 0 shows that both equations can be solved simultaneously for weakly positive
Lagrange multipliers if and only if λW (g,b) > 0 (i.e. W (g, b) = 0) and λW (b,b) = 0 with
(ICC) e′′(piA)+ e′(piA) = (1− p0)(1−piP )I (see (i)). W (b, b) > 0 is therefore determined by
incentive compatibility in Eqn. (4) (see (ii)). (iii) follows from the satisfied truth-telling
constraints and the nature of the signal. (iv) follows from inserting the transfers as specified
in (ii) into the principal’s profit function, and this yields (v) dΦ
dpiP
= (1− p0)(1− piA) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 10
(i) and (ii). First observe that Φ0 = ΦD|piA=0 = ΦC |piA=0. But as Lemma 8 (i) and 9(i)
and the assumptions on e(pi) imply that piDA > 0 and pi
C
A > 0 it follows that Φ
0 < ΦD and
Φ0 < ΦC . 
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Proof of Proposition 2
(i) ΦC − ΦI = (1 − p0)(piCA − piIA)I + (1 − p0)(1 − piCA)piP I − e′(piCA) + e
′(piIA)
1−p0 − e(piCA) +
e(piIA). Now suppose that in the concealment contract the suboptimal signal quality pi
I
A
is implemented. This leads to ΦC − ΦI > (1 − p0)(1 − piIA)piP I + e′(piIA)( 11−p0 − 1) > 0.
(ii) First, ΦD is continuous in piP and limpiP→0Φ
D = ΦI . Second, dΦ
D
dpiP
= (1 − p0)(1 −
piDA )I + e
′(piDA )
(1−p0)(1−2pP )
(1−pP )2 + (1 − p0)e(piDA ) such that pP ≤ 1/2 is sufficient condition for
dΦD
dpiP
> 0 (see Lemma 8 (vi)). And as dΦ
I
dpiP
= 0, (ii) follows. (iii) follows in a similar way
from limpiP→0Φ
D = ΦI and Lemma 8 (vii). 
Proof of Proposition 3
ΦC > ΦI has already been proven by Proposition 2 (i). To show that ΦD > ΦC holds,
consider the difference ΦD − ΦC and suppose that (the suboptimal signal quality) piCA is
implemented in the disclosure contract and denote the respective profit by ΦD(piA = pi
C
A).
We get ΦD(piA = pi
C
A) − ΦC = e′(piCA)1−pP−Pr(sP=g)1−pP + e(piCA)(1 − Pr(sP = g)). A sufficient
condition for this expression to be positive is 1−pP−Pr(sP=g)
1−pP > 0 which holds whenever
piP ∈ [1−
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ,
1+
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ]. For this interval to be a non-empty, non-degenerate, connected
subset of (0, 1), p0 has to be smaller than 1/4 - for p0 = 1/4 the condition shrinks to
piP = 2/3 and in the limit p0 → 0 the interval becomes (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) This follows directly from ΦC > ΦI (see Proposition 2(i)), the continuity of ΦD in
piP , and limpiP→0Φ
D = ΦI as shown in the proof of Proposition 2(ii). (ii) Consider the
difference ΦC − ΦD and suppose that (the suboptimal signal quality) piDA is implemented
in the concealment contract. We denote the respective profit by ΦC(piA = pi
D
A ) and get
ΦC(piA = pi
D
A )−ΦD = −e′(piDA )1−pP−Pr(sP=g)1−pP −e(piDA )(1−Pr(sP = g)). A sufficient condition
for the first term to be positive (i.e. 1−pP−Pr(sP=g)
1−pP < 0) is that p0 > 1/4 or p0 ≤ 11/4
together with piP ∈ (0, 1−
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) ) or piP ∈ (
1+
√
1−4p0
2(1−p0) , 1) - see also the proof of Proposition
3. Now suppose that 1−pP−Pr(sP=g)
1−pP < 0. Then Φ
C(piA = pi
D
A )− ΦD > 0 whenever e
′(piA)
e(piA)
>
(1−Pr(sP=g))(1−pP )
Pr(sP=g)−(1−pP ) for all piA ∈ (0, 1).17 
17Note that the right-hand-side of the last inequality is positive and finite in the given range of piP . E.g.
e(piA) = pinA + δ(− ln (1− piA) − piA) can satisfy this condition for all piA, i.e. there is a δ˜ > 0 and n˜ > 0
such that e
′(piA)
e(piA)
> (1−Pr(sP=g))(1−pP )Pr(sP=g)−(1−pP ) ∀piA ∈ (0, 1) if δ ∈ (0, δ˜) and n > n˜.
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Appendix 2: Example for dΦ
D
dpiP
< 0
Suppose that e(piA) = CI
1
2
pi2A+δ(− ln (1− piA)−piA). As long as δ > 0, this effort function
satisfies all our assumptions18, while for δ > 0 sufficiently small and piA ∈ [0, 1), the
optimization program can be restricted to e(pii) = CI
1
2
pi2A and an analysis of the boundary
for piA ∈ [0, 1). Then, the first order conditions for a disclosure contract is
(1− pP )I = e
′′(piA)
1− pP + e
′(piA)
=
CI
1− pP + CIpiA
such that
piDA =
1− pP
C
− 1
1− pP . (15)
We restrict ourselves to parameter configurations where the agent is hired (piA > 0) and
where CI 1
2
pi2 is indeed an approximation of e(piA) (piA < 1). This requires C ∈ (C0, C1)
with C0 =
(1−pP )2
2−pP and C1 = (1−pP )2. We use this specification of e(pi) to give an example
for a profit function in an optimal disclosure contract that is locally decreasing in piP at
piP = 0. Observe first that
dΦD
dpiP
|piP=0 = (1− p0)(1− piDA )I − e′(piDA )
1− 2p0
1− p0 + (1− p0)e(pi
D
A ).
Inserting e(pi) as specified above and piDA as in Eqn. (15) yields
dΦD
dpiP
|piP=0 = −I(−4p20 +
3Cp0+6p
3
0−4p40+p50−3Cp20+p30C−C2p0+p0−C)/(C(1−p0)2) which is negative for every
C ∈ (1/2(−1+p0−
√
1− 2p0 + 5p20)(1−p0)2/p0, 1/2(−1+p0+
√
1− 2p0 + 5p20)(1−p0)2/p0).
Now note that the lower bound of this interval is negative for all p0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
d(ΦD)
dpiP
|piP=0 < 0 whenever C ∈ (C0, C1) and C < 1/2(−1 + p0 +
√
1− 2p0 + 5p20)(1 −
p0)
2/p0) ≡ C˜. A sufficient condition for such a C to exist is p0 > 3/4. Then C0 < C˜ < C1
and d(Φ
D)
dpiP
|piP=0 < 0 whenever C ∈ (C0, C˜).
18Only e′′(0) = 0 is not satisfied as this would drive the computation more cumbersome (solving cubic
instead of quadratic equations). Instead we restrict ourselves to parameter regions where the agent is hired
- see below.
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